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Note

Federal Tort Claims Act: FAA
Warnings to Private Aircraft
Passengers
Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)' specifically waives the
sovereign immunity of the United States for the torts of federal
employees. 2 The FTCA requires that the conduct for which the
government is liable must be the same as that for which a private
individual would be liable 3 under the law of the 4jurisdiction in
which the act or omission complained of occurred.
Because of the extensive involvement of the United States in
aviation, the FTCA has frequently been invoked in airplane crash
cases.5 Clemente v. United States6 arose out of the crash of a private aircraft that killed, among others, Roberto Clemente, a renowned professional baseball player. The plaintiffs claimed the
crash might have been prevented had Federal Aviation Adminiswarned Clemente of safety regulation vitration (FAA) inspectors
7
olations on that flight.
The court in Clemente faced the issue of whether a duty was
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
2. See id. § 2680 (list of exceptions to waiver of the government's sovereign immunity).
3. Id. §§ 1346(b), 2674.
4. Id. § 1346(b). See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962); Bonn v.Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 1975).
5. E.g., Todd v. United States, 553 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1977); Dickens v. United
States, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d
227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); In re Air Crash Disaster at New
Orleans, La., 422 F. Supp. 1166 (W.D. Tenn. 1975), affd, 544 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.
1976); Thinguldstad v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 551 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Sullivan v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala. 1968), affid, 411 F.2d 794 (5th
Cir. 1969).
6. 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
7. Id. at 1143.
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imposed on the United States, through the FAA, by the promulgation of an FAA administrative directive. This note will examine
the court's decision that no duty was imposed which ran to the
passengers of the flight that killed Clemente. 8 No attempt is made
to discuss the sufficiency of safety precautions in private aircraft
and government regulation thereof.
11.

THE FACTS

On September 25, 1972, the Director of the Southern Region of
the FAA issued Order S08430.20C, which was implemented in San
Juan, Puerto Rico, by at least October 31, 1972.9 The order, as
quoted by the court, stated in relevant part:
1.

PURPOSE. This order outlines procedures for a continuous surveillance program of large and turbine powered airplanes....

3. ACTION.... to establish the method for notification of arriving and
departing large aircraft and turbine powered aircraft that cannot be
Representative of
readily identified as bona fide air carriers ....
these are: ... DC-7... To accomplish this program effectively, consideration should be given to night and weekend surveillance... as

necessary.
5.

BACKGROUND. Several accidents/incidents involving noncertifled
carriers disclosed. . . operators were transporting specialized groups
... without an appropriate operating certificate, and little regard to
airworthiness safety standards on their aircraft. ...

7.

ON SITE INSPECTION
a. Conduct ramp inspection with at least the following emphasis to
determine that the crew and operator comply with... [these] requirements for safety of flight.

(6)

Airworthiness of the aircraft.

(8)

Weight and Balance

(10) Pilot qualification ....
d.... Clear indication of alleged illegal flight1 0should be made known to
flight crew and persons charteringthe service.
8. Since the court of appeals held that no cause of action was established by the
plaintiffs, the court did not address the issue of whether the FAA inspectors'
conduct was covered by the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a) (1976). 567 F.2d at 1150 n.15.
9. Clemente v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 564, 570 (D.PR. 1976), rehearing
denied, 426 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
10. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added).
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The DC-7CF aircraft chartered by Mr. Clemente to fly relief
supplies to earthquake stricken Nicaragua 1 was damaged while
taxiing in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on December 2, 1972. The propellers on engines No. 2 and No. 3 stopped suddenly upon hitting "a
hard object"'12 after the plane had veered off the taxiway. On two
separate occasions, the accident was investigated by FAA inspectors. 13 After repairs were completed by qualified mechanics, 14 the
plane was returned to the owner and it was not flown again until
the Clemente charter. The FAA inspectors were aware subseowner was again adverquent to the December 2 accident that the
15
tising the plane as available for charter.
The flight to Nicaragua was attempted on December 31, 1972,
and the weather on that date was excellent. 16 A witness reported
that the aircraft struggled to gain altitude on takeoff1 7 and within
three minutes after takeoff, San Juan Control Tower received a
brief transmission from the pilot stating only that the airplane was
coming back to land. The aircraft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean
before it could return to land. Three of the four engines were recovered from the Atlantic and engines No. 2 and No. 3 showed
signs of failure prior to the crash. 18
The fuel receipts and customs declaration examined during the
post-crash investigation revealed that the gross takeoff weight of
the aircraft was 4,193 pounds over the maximum allowable gross
weight of 144,750 pounds. 19 The Federal Air Regulations required
11. Several airplane loads of supplies had already been transported to Nicaragua
when the last airplane prepared to leave on December 30, 1972. When the last
flight could not hold all the cargo available, Mr. Clemente was approached by
Arthur S. Rivera, owner of the DC-7CF, who made his airplane available for
charter to Clemente. Id. at 566.
12. Id. at 565-66.
13. Both of the principal investigators were by chance present at the San Juan
airport on the date of the accident. Id. at 566.
14. The mechanics were apparently satisfied that the airplane was fully repaired
because one of them, Francisco Matias, was aboard the fight with Clemente
and died in the crash. Id.
15. Id. at 566 n.7.
16. There were scattered clouds at 2,200 feet above sea level and the visibility
was 10 miles. Id. at 567.
17. The witness testified that on takeoff the engines sounded even and normal.
At the end of the takeoff roll, he heard three backfires and a different engine
sound, caused by a change in engine revolutions. After the aircraft was out of
sight, he heard an explosion. Id. at 567-68 n.12.
18. Rough seas prevented recovery of any portion of the airplane for about a
week. Engine No. 2 was recovered with a "feathered" propeller, a situation in
which the propeller blades are mechanically rotated to a position parallel to
the onrushing wind so as to present the least wind resistance after an engine
failure. The magnetic sump pump of engine No. 3 contained broken pieces of
cylinder rings, but the rings were found intact in the cylinders. Id. at 568.
19. Id. at 567.
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the crew for that ffight to consist of a qualified pilot in command, a
co-pilot and a ffight engineer. 20 The pilot in command was well
qualified,2 1 but the owner, who was not qualified, served as co-pilot22 and did not succeed in obtaining a flight engineer for the
flight.23
The relatives of Clemente and the other passengers brought
suit against the United States under the FTCA.24 The district court
held that the FAA order was mandatory upon the FAA personnel,25 that the order created a duty to the passengers as a matter of
law,26 and that the failure to follow the order was a cause of the
accident. 27 Accordingly, the district court found for the plaintiffs
on the issue of negligence.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
A.

Indian Towing Co. v. United States

In Clemente, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit based its
decision upon the Supreme Court's rejection of the government's
sovereignty defense in Indian Towing Co. v. United States. 2 8 The
Clemente court reasoned that since the government was to be examined in the same manner as a private individual,2 9 the acts and
orders of the United States should be viewed as made by a private
individual and not by a sovereign government.3 0 FAA orders such
20. 14 C.F!.R §§ 121.385(b), 121.385(c) (3), 121.387 (1978).

21. He held an airline transport pilot certificate issued by the FAA with multi-

engine and instrument ratings, plus a DC-7 type rating. Of his approximately

22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
,27.

12,500 hours of flight time, about 3,000 hours had been spent in DC-7 type
aircraft, and he had last flown a DC-7 on November 10, 1972. 422 F. Supp. at
567.
Although Rivera held a commercial pilot's certificate with instrument and
multi-engine ratings, he was not type certificated by the FAA for DC-7 aircraft and only 6 hours of his 1,900 total flying hours had been accumulated in
DC-7 aircraft. Id.
Id.
Clemente v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 564 (D.PIR. 1976), rehearingdenied,
426 F. Supp. 1 (D.PIR), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1006.
Id. at 571-72.
Id.
Id. at 572. Under the tort law of Puerto Rico, it was not necessary that this be
the only proximate cause of the accident- it was sufficient to find it was a
proximate cause. See note 53 & accompanying text infra.

28. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See also Union Trust Co. v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 80
(D.D.C. 1953), affld in part, rev'd in part on other groundssub nom. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), affd, 350 U.S. 907
(1955), modified, 350 U.S. 962 (1956).
29. Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d at 1144. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674
(1976).

30. 567 F.2d at 1144.

292
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as Order SO8430.20C were therefore viewed, not "as commands
which create legal duties or standards,"'3 ' but rather as "in the context of an employee relationship... which includes reciprocal du32
ties.., but not necessarily a legal duty to the citizenry."
In addition, the court found no Puerto Rico case imposing liability in a similar situation.33 The court then considered the Restatement (Second) of Torts,34 which bases liability on one of three
grounds if the order is viewed as made by a private individual:
[T]he conduct of the employee actually increased the risk or harm to the
damaged [persons]; the harm to the damaged [persons] resulted from
[their] reliance on the employee carrying out the inspection as ordered; or
there existed a prior duty to inspect owed by the employer to the damaged
[persons] .35

The Clemente court also indicated reliance was a crucial factor
in determining the Supreme Court's holding in Indian Towing
Co. 3 6 The court in Clemente found no indication that Clemente
and his fellow passengers, "or anyone else for that matter,"37 had
ever relied on the FAA to inspect a charter flight before departure.38
B.

The Policy Grounds

The court felt that to decide that a duty existed would "interpret every command made . . .by the . . . staff of any federal
agency as creating a duty of the federal government to the beneficiaries of that command such that the government would be liable
to the beneficiary if the command was not carried out." 39 It described this result as "limitless liability," 4o and repudiated
any
41
case which might be interpreted to hold such a duty exists.
The court also suggested that the surrender of immunity by the
42
United States in the FTCA "should be interpreted narrowly."
The court stated no further reasons or citations of authority for
this rule of law, but nevertheless felt it must submit the cases cited
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1145. See note 53 & accompanying text infra.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).

35. 567 F.2d at 1145 (paraphrasing RSsTATEMENT (SECOND)
(1965)).

OF TORTS § 324A

36. 567 F.2d at 1148. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65, 69
(1955).
37. 567 F.2d at 1148.

38. Id.

39. Id. at 1145-46 (footnote omitted).
40. Id at 1146.
41. The court stated: 'We...would not so hold unless we were required to do
so by established precedent." Id.

42. 1&
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by the district court to "critical scrutiny."4 3
C. Air Traffic Controller Cases
The court spent a great deal of energy distinguishing those
cases involving air traffic controllers from the situation before it. 4 4
The court found three particular differences of importance:
First, they operate under federal rules which were clearly designed to es-

tablish standards of care for a particular role, regardless of the status of
the employee... fulfilling it...
Second, the nature of the role of air tower operators involves various
duties to air traffic regardless of the procedures promulgated in the [air
controller's] manual....

The third ... is a corollary of the second. The relationship between
pilots and passengers and air controllers is imbued with reliance.. .45

The court did not foreclose a duty from developing in the future
between passengers in private aircraft and FAA inspectors, but indicated that "there is no basis for assuming that particular duties,
not defined by statute, apply to this role."4
The court then shifted its attention to the pilot by citing to the
FAA regulation which provides that "[t] he pilot in command of a
civil aircraft is responsible for determining whether that aircraft is
in condition for safe flight."47 The court added to this rule the observation that "[t]here is no suggestion in the present case that
the pilot did not know or should not be held responsible for such
facts as the qualification of his crew and the weight of his cargo."48
IV. ANALYSIS
The court attempted to blur the question of the liability of the
United States by referring to the FAA regulation 4 9 assigning the
pilot final responsibility for aircraft operation. 50 Unquestionably,
the pilot in command negligently failed to perform his duties to
control the weight5 2of the aircraft at takeoff5 1 and the qualifications
of the flight crew.
However, Puerto Rico law assigns liability to negligence which
was a proximate cause of the accident, regardless of whether it
was the only proximate cause or whether another's negligence was
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 1146-49. See notes 78-79 & accompanying text infra.
567 F.2d at 1147-48.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1149 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.29(b) (1978)).
567 F.2d at 1149 n.13.
See notes 47-48 & accompanying text supra.
Id. This seems to have the effect of pinning liability on the person least likely
to be around after the crash.
51. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
52. See notes 20-23 & accompanying text supra.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 58:288

also a proximate cause of the accident. 53 If the FAA inspectors
breached a duty owed to the plaintiffs' decedents and the breach
was a proximate cause of their death, the United States ought to be
liable under the FTCA,54 regardless of whether the negligence of
another also contributed to the accident.
The policy reasons cited by the court in Clemente are unconvincing and unsupported 5- by the other principal authorities referred to by the court. The court looked to Union Trust Co. v.
United States5 6 and to the Supreme Court's decision in Indian
Towing Co. v. United States57 for a discussion of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA. The Supreme Court explained
the FTCA as follows:
The statute was the product of nearly thirty years of congressional consideration and was drawn with numerous substantive limitations and administrative safeguards.... The broad and just purpose which the statute
was designed to effect was to compensate the victims of negligence in the
53. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968) provides in relevant part: "A person who
by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done."
In Reyes v. Heirs of SAnchez Soto, 98 P.R.R. 299, 303-04 (1970), the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico described the statute as "infinitely embracing,
as ample and embracing as human conduct is." In addition, the court in Correa v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 83 P.R.R. 139, 149 (1961), described
that statutory duty as "a broad blanket" arising "without any preceding juridical relation 'except for the generic duty, common to all men, of not causing
damage to another."' See also Gin~s Mel6ndez v. Puerto Rico Aquaduct &
Sewer Auth., 86 P.LR. 490, 497 (1962).
54. The intent of Congress is clearly reflected in the language of the statute: 'The
United States shall be liable ... in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances ....
" 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1976). See also note 58 & accompanying text infra.
55. See notes 58-64 & accompanying text infra.
56. 113 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953), affd in part, rev'd in part on othergrounds sub
nom. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), affid,
350 U.S. 907 (1955), modified, 350 U.S. 962 (1956). The court in Union Trust Co.
indicated the expansive nature of the FTCA.
The present climate of public opinion, of which the Federal Tort
Claims Act is the most conspicuous example, is to the effect that the
fiction of sovereign immunity is for the most part outmoded and as
far as it relates to the act in question, preserved only in those specific
exceptions which Congress has specifically indicated ....
Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
57. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). This case was the subject of numerous casenotes shortly
after the decision was announced. See, e.g., Note, Governmental Functions
and the Tort Claims Act, 70 Haxv. L REV. 134 (1956); Note, Governmental
Function-Liabilityof UnitedStatesfor Damages,42 IowA L. REV. 130 (1956);
Note, Pertinence of Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction,54 MICH. L. REV.
875 (1956); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-A Liberalized Interpretation,35
NEB. L. REV. 509 (1956); Note, Governmental Function Test Rejected in Determination of FederalLiability at the "Operational"Level, 34 TEx. L REV. 956
(1956).
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conduct of governmental activities in circumstances like unto those in
which a private person would be liable .... [T]his Court must not ... as

a self-constituted guardian of the Treasury import immunity back into a
statute designed to limit it 58

Nevertheless, the court in Clemente believed the FTCA "should be
interpreted narrowly."5 9 No authority was cited for this belief, and
i is in apparent conflict with the Supreme Court's positiom
Both Union Trust Co. and Indian Towing Co. involved situations in which the government made a discretionary decision to
undertake some new activity,6 0 and then failed to perform the activity with due care. Both courts were consistent in holding that,
although the government would not have been liable if the activity
had not commenced,6 1 once performance began the62government
had a duty to perform these activities with due care.
In addition, the court in Clemente forecast future "limitless liability" if the government were held liable in this instance 6 3 However, even if a general rule that government orders establish a duty
existed, there remains a distinct difference between the Clemente
situation and the majority of governmental employer-employee relationships. The foreseeability of harm to the class of individuals
sought to be protected by the order is much greater in the area of
mass transportation safety than in most other areas of government
activity.6 4 The delivery of most government services does not subject the recipient to possible death or serious physical injury.
Since most services involve potential economic injury only, the
need for the imposition of a duty to fufill the order with due care is
not as strong.
The Clemente decision correctly stated the approach which
58. 350 U.S. at 68-69.
59. 567 F.2d at 1146.
60. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (Coast Guard established and maintained marine navigational lighthouse); Union Trust Co. v.
United States, 113 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953), affid in part, rev'd in part on
other groundssub nom. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir.), affld, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), modified, 350 U.S. 962 (1956) (FAA undertook operation of aircraft control tower at Washington National Airport).
61. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. at 69; Union Trust Co. v. United
States, 113 F. Supp. at 84.
62. Id.
63. 567 F.2d at 1146.
64. The allegations would still be limited by the traditional tort doctrines of the
various jurisdictions. Particularly, the element of causation would restrict recovery in many cases in which a breach of a duty owed to a member of the
public could be shown. See Bristow v. United States, 309 F.2d 465 (6th Cir.
1962) (per curiam) (FAA negligence in issuing airworthiness certificate cut off

by intervening negligence of pilot). See also Note, The Federal Seal of Approval. Government Liabilityfor Negligent Inspection, 62 GEo. L.J. 937, 957
(1974). See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 41-45 (4th ed. 1971).
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should be taken when reviewing an administrative order such as
that issued by the FAA in this instance. 65 The language of the
FTCA supports the "sovereignty in reverse" analysis under which
such orders are to be viewed as a directive from a private employer
to his employee. 66 Still, a statute or regulation is not easily distinguished from this type of directive, in that a statute or regulation is
intended to be relied upon by the general public when promulgated, and the administrative directive involved in Clemente, while
aimed mainly at government officials, is of interest to the public.
Particularly because the government performs many services
which private individuals do not, rejection of the argument of the
plaintiffs in Clemente should not be viewed as absolving the government of responsibility under the FTCA in these activities, even
67
though no private individual undertakes them.
The court banished to the footnotes of its opinion discussion of
two cases it had itself earlier decided. The first, Gercey v. United
States,68 held that the Coast Guard was not negligent "in failing to
adopt a policy of taking positive steps to protect the public from
vessels whose certificates have been revoked. ' 69 But the court in
Gercey 70 qualified its holding by stating- "[T] he Coast Guard's alleged negligence lies in failing to adopt a policy.., not in imperfectly executing a federal program established either by an act of
'7 1
Congress or a federal regulation."
This language implies that had the Coast Guard adopted a
"policy of taking positive steps" '72 and not carried it out with the
exercise of due care, a different result would have been obtained in
Gercey. This language appears readily applicable to the fact situa65. See notes 28-32 & accompanying text supra.
66. The FTCA provides: "The United States shall be liable ... in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.... ." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) (emphasis added). An individual issuing such an order to one of his employees would not generally establish a
standard of care as the government does in enacting a statute or regulation.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). The FCTA requires the

67.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

courts to view the government's acts and orders as if performed by a private
individual, and thus only as made in an employer-employee relationship.
That is the clear holding of Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955), and the cases following. The fact that no private individual maintains
marine navigational facilities such as lighthouses could not prevent recovery
when the activity (maintaining a lighthouse) was negligently performed. Id.
at 64-65.
540 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1976).
Id. at 538.
It should be noted that the court in Gercey consisted of the same two circuit
judges that sat in Clemente, which was decided by two circuit judges and a
district judge, and that Chief Judge Coffin authored both opinions.
540 F.2d at 538.
Id.
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tion presented to the district court in Clemente. And the language
of the lower court opinion indicates that the district court followed
this recent case for it cited to Gercey in the crucial paragraph discussing the duty established by the FAA order.73 Clearly, the language of Gercey dealing with negligence in the execution of a
federal program is dictum. However, the facts in Clemente were
sufficiently similar that the district court could reasonably have
followed that language.
The First Circuit was also forced to deal with the language of
another of its own cases, DeltaAir Lines, Inc. v. United States.74 In
that case the court announced the broad principle that "the unexcused violation by a federal employee of procedures established by
the Government which have as their purpose the protection of
those who were in fact harmed constitutes negligence." 75 The situation in Clemente unquestionably fits within that linguistic framework. The court in Clemente explained this away by noting that
the case involved air traffic controllers. 76 The court explained its
Gercey language by noting that the FAA order S08430.20C was
neither a statute nor a regulation. 77 While these statements indicated the language of Gercey and DeltaAir Lines was not controlling in Clemente, they did not explain why the rule each
announced should not be followed.
The Clemente court distinguished air traffic controllers from
FAA inspectors by looking to the history of the development of air
traffic control.78 Indeed, in almost every FTCA case involving airplane crashes arising outside the military, the plaintiffs alleged
negligence on the part of air traffic controllers. 79 No case appears
to allege a breach of a duty to inspect on the part of other FAA
73. Clemente v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 564, 571 (D.PR. 1976), rehearing
denied, 426 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R.), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
74. 561 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1977).
75. Id. at 393-94.
76. 567 F.2d at 1147 n.10.
77. Id. at 1145 n.5.
78. Id. at 1147.
79. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 561 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1977);
Todd v. United States, 553 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1977); Dickens v. United States,
545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 422 F. Supp. 1166 (W.D. Tenn. 1975), affd, 544 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1976);
Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Ozark Air Lines,
Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. l. 1975); Allen v. United
States, 370 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Thinguldstad v. United States, 343 F.
Supp. 551 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Gill v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Tex.
1968), affid in par, rev'd in part, 429 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), appeal after
remand, 449 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1971); Union Trust Co. v. United States, 113 F.
Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953), ajffd in par rev'd in part on other groundssub nom.
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employees. 80
The lower court chose to follow language, which appears in
most air traffic controller cases: "It is now well established that
when the government undertakes to perform services, which in the
absence of specific legislation would not be required, it will, nevertheless, be liable if these activities are performed negligently." 81
The First Circuit restricted this doctrine solely to air controllers
by stating- "[T] he duties of air controllers ... are not analogous to
other facets of the FAA operations or the work of other federal
agencies. '82 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently would not agree. In Ingham v. EasternAir Lines, Inc.,83 the
court compared the breach of duty of an air controller to that of a
government hospital which was under no obligation to deliver
medical services to discharged veterans but when it did so negligently, was held liable under the FTCA.84 Although air controllers
have special duties running to the general public, 85 one should not
conclude that, therefore, no other group could have similar special
duties arising as a result of its gratuitous undertaking to perform
services to the public.
The convincing, yet troublesome portion of the Clemente
court's decision deals with reliance. 86 The cases upon which the

80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), aO'd, 350
U.S. 907 (1955), modified, 350 U.S. 962 (1956).
See also Levy, The ExpandingResponsibility of the Government Air Traffic Controller,36 FowDsUm L. REv. 401 (1968).
See, e.g., Bristow v. United States, 545 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1962) (per curiam)
(issuance of airworthiness certificate); Fielder v. United States, 423 F.
Supp. 77 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (failure to determine hang gliders were "aircraft");
Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (issuance of air
taxi/commercial operator certificate to air carrier); Marival, Inc. v. Planes,
Inc., 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (misrepresentation of airworthiness by
issuance of airworthiness certificate); Sullivan v. United States, 299 F. Supp.
621 (N.D. Ala. 1968), ard, 411 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1969) (preparation and circulation of aeronautical navigation charts); Gibbs v. United States, 251 F. Supp.
391 (ED. Tenn. 1965) (regulating flight and licensing of pilots).
Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 931 (1967).
567 F.2d at 1147 n.10.
373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
Id. at 236 (citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954)).
See, e.g., Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870, 873-74 (5th Cir. 1968).
Because the "sovereignty in reverse" analysis requires the FAA order to be
viewed as an order from a private individual employer to his or her employee,
recovery required a showing of (1) increased risk or harm from the failure to
inspect, (2) a prior duty to inspect, or (3) reliance by the plaintiffs' decedents
on the order to inspect and warn. See notes 34-38 & accompanying text supra.
The first two were clearly not present in Clemente, so recovery depended
upon a showing of reliance on the FAA inspection by the plaintiffs' decedents.
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district court relied find their basis in the "good Samaritan"
doc87
trine announced in Indian Towing Co. v. United States:
[I]t is hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public of
danger and thereby induces reliance must perform his "good Samaritan"
task in a careful manner.... The Coast Guard need not undertake the
lighthouse services. But once it [did]... and engendered relianceon the
88
guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care ....

There can be no doubt that the general public, including pilots
and passengers of all types of aircraft in particular, is aware of and
relies upon the assistance of air traffic controllers for at least some
flights.89 The question is whether the passengers killed on the
Clemente flight relied upon the FAA inspectors when they boarded

that flight.
Undoubtedly Clemente and the other passengers relied on the
expertise of the pilot and the owner. 90 They probably did not expect to see an FAA inspector on the ramp checking the pilots'
licenses and weighing the cargo. In addition, the FAA does not
have the resources necessary to check every departing charter
flight for compliance with every regulation. 91
However, the public is aware that aviation is regulated by the
FAA
in such areas as design certification, 92 licensing of mechanics, 93 maximum hours of service of airmen, 94 and accident investi87. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
88. Id. at 64-65, 69 (emphasis added).
89. See note 79 & accompanying text supra. See also Note, FederalTort Claims
Act-Good Samaritan Doctrine, 32 Am. TRAL. LAw. LJ. 702, 706-07 (1968);
Note, Air Traffic ControllerHas Duty to Warn Pilot of Adverse Weather Conditions That Cause Visibility to FallBelow FAA Minimums, 24 VAND. L. REv.
189, 191-93 (1970).
90. If the plaintiffs' decedents had believed the pilot and owner to be unreliable,
they would not have chartered or boarded that aircraft.
91. The total 1974 authorized employment of the Operations Division of the FAA
was 52,926 positions. Departmentof Transportationand Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1974: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Dept of Transportation and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations,93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 57 (1973). Of this total employment, some 21,846 positions were reserved for air traffic control Id. at 61. Of the remainder, only a small portion
served in the Flights Standards Office. From 1960 to 1970, the number of
flights handled under Instrument Flight Rules increased by over 100 percent.
FAA Am TRAmc AcTrvrry 3 (1970).
"On a typical day in 1960, there were more than 100,000 aircraft flights in
operation across the nation." R. BUREKADT, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADianisTATION 73 (1967). Indeed, "[i]t would be impossible for a ten person office
to be on hand wherever and whenever a private citizen chooses ... to engage
in air navigation." Reply Brief for Appellant at 14, Clemente v. United States,
567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
92. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1)(1976).
93. Id. § 1421(a) (3).
94. Id. § 1421(a) (5).
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gation.9 5 The passengers in Clemente may have relied on the FAA
to ascertain that the aircraft, which had obviously unairworthy
systems on December 2, 1972,96 was now airworthy on the first
flight of that aircraft after the December 2 accident.
Certainly, Indian Towing Co. differs from Clemente as to the
nature of the government's undertaking. In Indian Towing Co.,
the government placed a lighthouse into operation and kept it in
working order. It was a physical structure within the view of the
public. In Clemente, the FAA Order was by its very nature an intangible, existing only for brief moments when the physical actions to carry it out were accomplished. The passengers' reliance
must be found, if at all, in their observation of the FAA inspectors
carrying out the Order or reports of such observations by others.
Mere reference to the written order fails to qualify as reliance in
the Indian Towing Co. sense.
In addition, the Indian Towing Co. undertaking was continuous, mandatory, and performed in a single location. Enforcement
of the Clemente Order occurred only intermittently. The Order required spot checks, not a check on every departing aircraft. 97 And
the public could not conclude from the language of the Order itself
when and where such enforcement would occur. Reliance required knowledge of the decedents as to where and when such enforcement had previously occurred, and a reasonable belief that
such enforcement would again occur on their flight.
There was apparently no evidence indicating the reliance of the
plaintiffs' decedents on the FAA inspectors.98 But such evidence
was snuffed out, for the most part, by the death of Clemente and
his fellow passengers. It is not known whether Clemente or the
other passengers had previously flown aboard a chartered aircraft
being flown for the first time after repair from an accident. 99 But
those men might reasonably expect the FAA inspectors to follow
up their investigation of an accident involving an aircraft that the
inspectors knew was being offered for charter by personally ob95. Id. §§ 1354(a), 1354(c).
96. The accident which damaged, inter,'alia,,enginesNo. 2 and No. 3 was causedby
the failure of the braking and steering systems. Clemente v. United States,
422 F. Supp. 564, 565-66 (D.P.R. 1976), rehearing denied, 426 F. Supp. 1
(D.PIR), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
97. See text accompanying note 10 supra. Although the Order describes the program as "continuous," the phrases "consideration should be given" and "as
necessary" indicate a continuing program of spot checks is required. Id. at
570-71.
98. 567 F.2d at 1148.
99. One of the passengers, Francisco Matias, was a licensed airframe and powerplant mechanic. See note 14 supra. It is quite likely he had previously flown
for the first time after repairs, whether the repairs resulted from an accident
or otherwise.
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serving the aircraft before its departure on its first subsequent
flight. Depending on when such an inspection was made, it may or
may not have disclosed the defects in pilot qualifications and overweight cargo load. Evidence of reliance can be inferred from the
knowing use of the service performed. 100 The persons chartering
aircraft may not know that particular airplane's accident history,
but they should be entitled to know that if an accident had involved that aircraft, a reasonable inspection was thereafter made
to determine the airworthiness of aircraft covered by such an FAA
order.
V.

CONCLUSION

The court in Clemente wisely applied an analysis of the FAA
Order, rejecting the implied sovereignty of the government in all
acts.1 0 ' The distinction between air controllers and other federal
agencies should not control because the "good Samaritan" doctrine of Indian Towing Co.' 0 2 was not
intended to be restricted to a
03
single class of federal employees.
This decision rests on the court's assessment of the reliance of
Clemente and the other passengers on the FAA order to inspect all
aircraft of that type. Because no direct evidence of reliance was
introduced and the court found no evidence of prior, continuing
conduct from which reliance could be inferred, the decision of the
court is correct. 10 4 However, it should not be necessary that reliance on the language of the particular order be demonstrated; reliance on past conduct relating to the airworthiness of accident
100. See Seavey, Reliance Upon GratuitousPromises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv.
L. REV. 913 (1951). The author states:
A comparable case is one in which a person undertakes, either
gratuitously or otherwise, to protect another; the resulting tort liability for failure to give the protection is based on reliance. Thus, a railroad may not be required to station a watchman at a crossing.
However, a traveler injured at the crossing would not be barred by
his failure to take the customary methods of self protection if he had
been led to believe that a crossing tender would be present. Here is
conduct which has the effect of a gratuitous promise, since the prior
conduct has led the plaintiff to believe that the service would be
given.
Id. at 919 (footnotes omitted).
101. See notes 65-67 & accompanying text supra.
102. 350 U.S. at 64-65.
103. Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 931 (1967).
104. See notes 97-98 & accompanying text supra. The author does not expect the
FAA to investigate every charter flight under such an order as S08430.20C.
However, the FAA should follow through with such an inspection where it
has notice of airworthiness problems, whether caused by accident or otherwise, in an aircraft covered by such an FAA directive.

302

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 58:288

damaged aircraft should be sufficient. The government is not an
insurer of private aviation, but neither should the FAA be allowed
to ignore a problem in which it has already become involved.
William B. Cassel '79

